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Authority 5012755

By SLW NARA Date 7/9/02TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

July 6, 1973

PEKING 009

TO: Henry A. Kissinger
FROM: David Bruce

I have just talked to Al Jenkins about tonight's interview between Prime Minister and Congressional delegation, which was accompanied by wives and all its traveling companions except newsmen and photographers who, after preliminary snapshots, remained outside.

It seems to me, in view of the wide publicity Senator Magnuson, in talking later with journalists, has guaranteed about what took place and that twenty-four participants are familiar with details, it was best to send a telegram (reftel 0493 Secret Nodis) which is a factual account from notes taken by Solomon and memory of interchanges, which can at least serve as background for those who will have to deal with the consequences.

I should, however, like to add a personal comment. The visit by this delegation has from the beginning been a disaster due to the attitude and personality of its chairman, Magnuson. The other members have behaved discreetly and appropriately; the chairman from the beginning has been irritable. He was

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disgruntled by not being received on arrival by more high-ranking officials, by being interviewed at the airport by only one journalist, by the party being lodged in the Peking Hotel instead of a government guest house, but above all, which became a recurrent theme, not having an appointment with the Prime Minister.

During the next few days, he complained of how his time was being wasted in idle sight-seeing instead of discussions in matters of substance, that Chinese officials seemed unaware of the importance of Congress in our political system, and, in sum, was as petulant as if he were suffering from ptomaine poisoning.

The other members were courteous and appreciative of the efforts of their Chinese hosts, but the Senator pre-empted planning, and kept asking when they would see Chou En-lai, observing that from reading the Chinese Daily Bulletin he had noticed the Prime Minister had met at the airport, invited to his office, and gave banquets to delegations from Romania, Malta, and other inconsequential countries, but apparently did not comprehend the power of the U.S. Congress. He mellowed somewhat at the fourth of July reception, drank Vodka, conversed amiably with Ch'iao Kuan-hua, who had received them the same afternoon and asked him whether they would be seeing Chou En-lai for otherwise their trip would have been useless.

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Here it is, and nothing to be done about the unfavorable impression undoubtedly created.

Warm regards.

End of Message.

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SECRET

WH 7

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 377
BT
SECRET PEKING 0493

CONTROL: 1 3 7 9 Q
JULY 6, 1973
11:21 AM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 JUL 6 PM 3:31

NODIS

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: CREP, CH

SUBJ: PREMIER CHOU'S RECEPTION OF CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION

1. PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI RECEIVED THE ENTIRE WASHINGTON CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION INCLUDING WIVES AND ESCORTS BUT NOT NEWSMEN OR PHOTOGRAPHERS - PHOTOS WERE TAKEN BEFOREHAND IN ANTE-ROOM

JENKINS ALSO PRESENT - FOR 1 HOUR 20 MINUTES IN THE GREAT HALL FRIDAY AFTERNOON, JULY 6. SESSION WAS DOMINATED BY DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PREMIER AND SENATOR MAGNUSON ON THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION. AFTER PLEASANTRIES, DELEGATION CHAIRMAN MAGNUSON STRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT "TRADE IS A TOOL FOR PEACE" AND THAT US-PRC RELATIONS ARE BASIC TO PEACE IN THE WORLD. CHOU RESPONDED WITH AN ANALYSIS OF HIS DOUBTS ABOUT A PEACEFUL WORLD. HE DETAILED CHINA'S MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION DESPITE THE 1950 SINO-SOVIET TREAT OF FRIENDSHIP, ALLIANCE, AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, WHICH, HE SAID, NO LONGER EXISTS. HE WENT ON TO CALL INTO QUESTION THE VALUE OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR RECENTLY SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT AND SOVIET LEADER BREZHNEV AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE US-SOVIET SUMMIT.

2. PREMIER CHOU THEN MADE INITIALLY LOW-KEY CRITICISM OF U.S. BOMBING IN CAMBODIA, TO WHICH MAGNUSON RESPONDED THAT CONGRESS HAD JUST VOTED TO HAVE THE BOMBING STOPPED BY AUGUST 15. MAGNUSON STRESSED THAT THE BOMBING HALT WAS THE WORK OF CONGRESS, WHICH CONTROLLED THE PURSE STRINGS OF THE U.S. G. HE URGED CHOU TO BE PATIENT FOR THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. CHOU RESPONDED BY NOTING THE CHINESE CAPACITY FOR PATIENCE, BUT ADDING THAT THIS QUALITY WAS NOT UNLIMITED, "AND WHEN A PROBLEM REACHES A CERTAIN DEGREE, IT WILL HAVE TO BE SOLVED." HE CITED HIS RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH SINGAPORE, WHO HAD RETURNED TO PEKING FROM EUROPE THE PREVIOUS

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DAY, OBSERVING THAT IT WAS HARD TO ASK THE PRINCE TO BE PATIENT WHEN BOMBS WERE FALLING ON ONE'S HEAD. MAGNUSON NOTED THERE HAD BEEN SOME ESCALATION IN THE BOMBING IN THE WAKE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE. CHOU COMMENTED THAT THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE CALLED FOR SOLUTION OF THE INDOCHINA WAR BEFORE THE TAIWAN SITUATION, AND ASKED MAGNUSON IF HE WOULD NOT AGREE THAT CHINA HAD SHOWN CONSIDERABLE PATIENCE ON THE TAIWAN QUESTION.

3. THE DISCUSSION REMAINED KEYED TO THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN CAMBODIA DESPITE EFFORTS OF REPRESENTATIVES MORGAN AND MCFALL TO SHIFT IN OTHER DIRECTIONS. THE PREMIER NOTED WITH SOME IMPATIENCE THAT THE CONGRESSMEN HAD ONLY COME TO SEE CHINA, NOT TO TALK ABOUT CAMBODIA, AND THAT HE DID NOT WHICH TO MEDDLE IN U.S. INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE ONLY HAD WANTED TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL POSITION ON THE BOMBING. CHOU ADDED THAT HE HAD TO GO SHORTLY AS HE WAS GIVING A BANQUET FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK. HE SAID THAT THE PRINCE WOULD "FIRE SOME CANNONS THIS EVENING" BECAUSE U.S. BOMBS WERE FALLING ON HIS COUNTRY. AS THE DELEGATION LEFT THE HALL, MAGNUSON INQUIRED WHEN THE PREMIER MIGHT BE COMING TO THE U.S. CHOU REPLIED IN A LOW VOICE HE COULD NOT COME BECAUSE CHIANG KAI-SHEK HAD A REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON.

4. TO OUR DISMAY, SINCE WE HAD BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMEN ABOUT THE DELICACY OF RELATIONS HERE, ESPECIALLY IN RESPECT TO PRESS DISCLOSURES OF CONVERSATIONS THE CHINESE REGARD AS CONFIDENTIAL. SENATOR MAGNUSON RECOUNTED MAJOR POINTS OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH CHOU TO U.S. WIRE SERVICE CORRESPONDENTS TOURING WITH THE GROUP. WE WERE ONLY INFORMED OF THIS LATER IN THE EVENING.

BRUCE

NOTE: NOT PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 7/6/73.

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